From Isolationism to War Patrick Williams Dr. B. G. McDonald HIE 366 15 April 2011 On 7 December 1941, shortly after seven in the morning, Japanese airmen, amidst the cries of “Banzai”, commenced the bombing of Pearl Harbour, leaving them to wonder if the Americans had ever heard of the 1904 surprise attack on the Russian Naval base at Port Arthur. In less than twenty-four hours after the Japanese aggression, United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt would address the congress:

Yesterday, December 7, 1941 – a date which will live in infamy – the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan…. I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December seventh, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire. [1] As a result of this short, but poignant address, FDR had led his administration and fellow countrypersons from a primarily isolationist posture reminiscent of the twenties, to a posture of armed belligerency in the forties.

What caused American foreign policy so drastically to alter its direction from the relatively insular isolationist posture, towards entanglement outside the western hemisphere? The Roosevelt administration’s foreign policy can be viewed in two distinct phases, from 1932 to 1937 and from 1937 to 1941. The foreign policies in phase one were dominated by the small but influential senate members who were decidedly isolationist in posture. The second phase illustrates the receding influence of the isolationists and FDR’s successful shift in foreign policy towards internationalism.

Franklin D. Roosevelt’s initial foray into politics led him to adopt a roused internationalist posture. Woodrow Wilson’s presidential success in 1912, in which FDR vigorously supported Wilson’s progressive ideas, was the launching pad for young FDR’s political career. In March 1913, Wilson, upon the advice of Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, appointed FDR to the position of assistant secretary of the navy. [2] Fulfilling Wilson’s expectations, FD shared the president’s international perspective.

During the pre-war years FDR pushed for the preparedness of American military forces, he believed that: “… the United States should defend its principles as well as its territory, and that sooner or later his country would enter the war. “[3] In 1919, Allied victory and the ensuing Versailles Peace Conference gained FDR valuable international exposure to foreign policy. Accompanying Wilson, FDR was to act in the capacity to supervise the disposition of naval supplies and other related matters. 4] While previously an enthusiastic supporter of President Wilson’s dream of American entry into the League of Nations, by 1920, as a result of the senate’s rejection of the proposal, convinced FDR that the once favourable public support was growing weary of Wilsonianism. [5] Throughout the twenties FDR gingerly supported American entry into the League of Nations. His decision to run for the Presidency led FDR to drop his Wilsonian posture due to the perceived lack of public support for the league. [6] He reasoned that his alignment with the Democratic party towards the isolationist element was consistent with nationalist sentiment.

FDR’s change in policy also illustrates the need to make concessions in order to gain political backing. Under pressure from influential right-wing Democrat and publishing mogul William Randolph Hearst, in exchange for his support of FDR’s nomination required a denunciation of his Wilsonian internationalism. FDR adroitly obliged to Hearst’s request and, on 2 February 1932, FDR announced that he was in favour of staying out of the League but so as not to antagonize the former Wilsonians he stated that: “… the League of Nations today is not the league conceived by Woodrow Wilson. [7] Roosevelt learned early the valuable political tool of concessions. FDR’s volte-face in foreign policy, which included opposition to the league and war debt repayments, promoted republican opponent Hubert Hoover to comment FDR to be: “A Chameleon on plaid. “[8] The 1932 Presidential Campaign led to FDR’s sweeping electoral victory of forty-two out of the forth-eight states,[9] ushering out, at least temporarily, the last vestiges of internationalism. This sentiment was expounded upon during FDR’s inaugural address in 1933 in which he stated: “… as to put first things first. Our international trade relations through vastly improved are secondary… to establishment of a sound national economy. “[10] Having assumed the presidency amidst the depression, the FDR administration disregarded Hoover’s internationalist approach to economic recovery and adopted economic nationalism as a means for recovery. [11] Relying heavily on his newly found “brain trust”[12], FDR espoused a doctrine of internal recover, governmental regulations and the strength of big business on American economy. 13] This culminated in FDR’s ‘torpedoing’ of the 1933 London World Economic Conference. As a result of this gesture, FDR reaffirmed the primacy of domestic recovery over international financial cooperation. [14] Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, led American diplomacy during FDR’s first term as a result of FDR’s preoccupation with domestic affairs. [15] Cordell Hull was to write in his memoirs: “During his first term in office President Roosevelt was so immersed in an avalanche of domestic questions that he left me in almost full charge of foreign affairs…. [16] Occupying a Congress position for over twenty years the Tennessee Senator was a proponent for advancing the cause of peace through tariff reform. Hull based his assumptions on the fact that if countries could trade freely their economies would become interdependent that they could not risk going to war. [17] While his immediate hopes were dashed as a result of FDR’s bombshell telegram at the 1933 London Conference, Hull was able to extract from the Congress Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act in 1934. 18] Hull’s multilateral plans were tempered by the FDR administrations’s preference towards a bilateral agreements and nationalistic policies. It is not surprising that FDR’s policy reflected a tendency towards nationalist posture. Considering the recent past, historical precedence, public opinion and an influential isolationist senate governmental policies reflected the rejection of Wilson’s idealism. The factors contributing to American isolationism are varied and at times controversial. Consider political scientist Samuel Lubell’s thesis that ethnic minorities were the impetus for interwar isolationism. 19] Lubell argues that Americans of German, Irish, Scandinavian, and Italian origin, for a variety of reasons, felt embittered over the outcome of World War I, and reacted strongly against Democratic attempts to an international approach to world affairs (which would be decidedly pro-British and anti-German, anti-Italian). [20] However, it is commonly asserted that: “… most historians have found it incredible that the ethnic groups cited by Lubell, comprising a small majority of the national population could move the country to isolationism. [21] Historian Manfred Jonas refutes Lubell’s claim: “an examination of isolationist policies and statements of the movement’s leading spokesmen confirms that isolationism during the period not before the Second World War was not essentially an ethnic matter. “[22] Isolationism was in fact firmly established as an American tradition well before the twentieth century. Conduct of American foreign relations were tempered from its conception towards an inward looking posture. The most famous example of this rests with George Washington’s farewell address, delivered in September 1796:

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have as little political connection as possible. So far we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop…. “[23] The guiding tenet of American foreign policy for the next 140 years was the desire to steer clear of European entanglements. Two brief interludes from this posture occurred with the Spanish-American war (which was an Asian not European orientation) and American involvement in World War I. 24] The Monroe Doctrine of 1823, reaffirmed Washington’s original desire to direct the country’s energies inwards. A brain trust of then President Monroe, the doctrine in essence warned European powers to keep clear of the western hemisphere. [25] This resolve was contested in the late nineteenth century by Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt’s attempts at amassing an overseas empire. [26] Nevertheless, as a result of the Armistice emanating from the Paris Peace Talks, Americans disillusioned, turned inwards once again.

As a result of selfish nationalism at the table, the “red score” of 1919-1920, a new found confidence in the nation’s ability to take care of itself, geographical isolation and disillusion of the war debt problem during the 1920’s, American foreign policy adopted an isolationist posture. [27] The American trend towards rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and the policy of collective security was not an isolated case. In the twenties British liberals began to question German treatment under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. This belief was largely attributed to the introspective writings of W.

H Dawson’s Germany Under the Treaty, 1932, and economist John Maynard Keynes’ Economic Consequences of Peace, 1920. [28] The British Labour party, in 1931, as a result of the depression, turned its back on pressing international issues in order to concentrate upon domestic recovery. [29] FDR assumed office in 1932, however the senate, along with Secretary of State Hull, plays a commanding role in the conduct of the United States’ foreign policy. The influence was a result of their constitutional role in which it provides senators with an opportunity to articulate an alternative to post-war international designs. 30] There exists a debate whether isolationism is a befitting description of American foreign policy. In its truest sense isolationism would suggest a total absence from international affairs. The United States entered the twentieth century with overseas possessions and international economic interests which suggests the former definition to be inaccurate. Historian Albert K. Weinberg has suggested that a more befitting synonym to be non-entanglement. [31] Renowned isolationist senators William E. Boron and Hiram Johnson assert that the label of isolationism to be inappropriate.

Borch asserted that he had: “never been opposed to cooperation in grave emergency. “[32] For the purpose of this paper ‘isolationists’ will encompass those who believed the United States should keep themselves independent of any commitments which may involve them in war and concentrate on keeping out of foreign wars. [33] While the term ‘internationalists’ will denote those who held that crisis and wars in other parts of the world effected American interests and security and thus they should cooperate to prevent wars from erupting. [34]

Senator Key Pittman, democrat and senator from Nevada, served as chairman of the senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1933 to his death in 1940. His position and political tendencies are important in the examination of FDR policy making towards isolationism and interventionism in the 1930’s. Senator Pittman’s relations with Secretary of State Cordell Hull remained cordial in spite of their differing views on American Foreign Policy. [35]The relatively small size of the senate and the role of the Foreign Relations Committee allowed a select group of senators a position on Foreign Policy, a position which held FDR’s ear.

The composition of the Committee between 1933 and 1940 included a powerful isolationist element. They included among others William E. Borah of Idaho, Hiram Johnson of California, Arthur H. Vordenberg of Michegan, and Robert M. Lafollette, Jr. , of Wisconsin. [36]Senator Pittman as well to contend with a less influential internationalists membership within his committee. Acting as a loyal party member Pittman cooperated with the President and advocated policies of military preparedness. [37] The power which the isolationists wielded over American Foreign Policy is evidenced during the passing of the neutrality laws from 1935 to `939.

In the United States, memory of the World War took the form of the neutrality laws designed to prevent Americans from being drawn into war. The impetus for this sentiment was the findings of the Nye Committee on inappropriateness of the munitions industry. Senator Gerald Nye, a Progressive Republican from North Dakota, was asked to investigate the ‘unholy alliance’ of bankers and munitions makers – the notorious ‘merchants of death’ – who supposedly manoeuvred America into war in 1917 for profits. 38] This well publicized investigation convinced the American public and Congress that history was not to be repeated and sought means in which to impede it. In the spring of 1935, fascist Italy under Benito Mussolini became increasingly belligerent towards Ethiopia. Faced with the threat of war the Senatorial isolationists sought means to avoid entanglement. Researchers for the Nye Committee drafted a new law with three provisions – a ban on travel by Americans to the war zone (to avoid another Lusitania incident)[39] , a ban on loans by Americans to belligerent, and an impartial embargo on arms to belligerent. 40] According to historian Richard D. Challenger, these measures were an attempt to create a legislative Maginot line. FDR realizing the limitation this placed upon Executive action, had the state department devise a plan which would give him the power to evoke the provisions. The isolationist majority in Congress vehemently opposed the presidential option and insisted upon an automatic embargo. Hull, threatened by a filibuster in the Senate, reluctantly advised the President to sign the neutrality law. 41] FDR signed the legislation with some slight hope as the key provisions were to expire on the end of February 1936. By 1935 FDR’s political flexibility was undercut by domestic isolationist sentiment. His attempts at gaining a ‘moral embargo’, a voluntary agreement to prevent unintentional aid to a belligerent and increase to executive power were repeatedly denounced by the congressional isolationists. This embodied the isolationists main argument that embargoes on arms and trade would prevent American involvement in war. 42] Consequently, he acquiesced to popular opinion and waited for events to educate the American people and a powerful isolationist senate. [43] FDR, mindful as well of prevailing public opposition to foreign entanglements, used his August 1936 campaign speech at Chautaugua New York to identify his administration with those who wished to insulate America from all conflict. [44] FDR astutely concluded the necessity to support the views and opinions of the voters. “Peace is like Charity”, he told his audience, “begins at home. That’s why we have begun at home….

We seek to isolate ourselves from war… I have seen war… I hate war. “[45] In december 1936, FDR used the occasion of the Buenos Aires Conference on Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, as means for obtaining place in a worsening European situation. By late 1936, the European situation was tenuous. Hitler was threatening on the Rhineland, the Spanish Civil War continued, Japan and Germany had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact against the Soviet Union[46], and Great Britain and France solidly adhered to policies of passive politics.

The President was able to secure, by the attuning nations, an agreement in principle to consultation and cooperative action in the event of a threat to any Hemispheric nation from the old world. [47] FDR did not receive any challenge from the isolationists as the United States was not subject to any collective security actions. The Ludlow referendum illustrates the tenuous position in which FDR had to manoeuvre his administration. After passage of the 1937 permanent Neutrality Act, isolationists and lobby groups sought to revive and support of the 1935 Ludlow Referendum. 48]FDR had to employ the backing of several ‘political heavy weights’ among them Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, to raise opposition to the scheme. Hull also publicly objected to the amendment, warning: “that it would seriously handicap the conduct of Foreign Policy and impair disastrously the government’s efforts to keep the peace. “[49] Floor leader Sam Rayburn came to the aid of the President, delivering an impassioned plea against: “this most tremendous blunder. [50] On January 10, 1938, the House of Representatives debated the resolution which was defeated by an unimpressive margin of 209 to 188. This narrow margin of victory highlighted the obstacles confronting Roosevelt in his quest to ensure a peaceful foreign policy. The Autumn of 1937 marks the first hesitant steps by FDR towards the abandonment of isolationism. In his famous ‘quarantine’ speech in Chicago on 5 October, 1937, FDR condemned: “the present reign of terror and international lawlessness… if chaos continues, let no one imagine that America will escape….

When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease. [51] His reference to ‘quarantine’ or isolating the aggressor was a departure from the practice of isolating the United States from the aggressor. The ‘quarantine’ speech was ill received by isolationist and pacifist lobby groups. They interpreted FDR’s speech to imply that war could be averted by providing for a collective neutrality. 52] FDR, as a result of congressional uproar, executed a tactical retreat, a move which Cordell Hull claims to have set the policy of international cooperation back six months. [53] FDR had taken one step towards international cooperation only to have been driven two steps back. The European situation in 1938 was to worsen. On the evening of 11 March, 1938, Hitler, to the surprise of few, invaded Austria. China was at the mercy of the Japanese, Italian General Franco was close to success in Spain, and Britain and France concluded little could be done in wake of Hitler’s aggression and continued their appeasement policy.

FDR, after receiving a negative reply fro British Prime Minister Chamberlain about his initiative for peace, declined to adopt measures which might undermine their appeasement policy. On 27 September, 1938, in response to Hitler’s aggression in the Rhineland, FDR cabled to Munich the American position in world affairs. The cable comprised of a weak hope that war could still be avoided and that the United States had no interest in Europe and would assume no obligations at the Munich negotiations. [54] By the end of 1938, FDR’s conviction that the danger was near grew stronger.

His message to Congress on 4 January 1939 was evidence of his conviction when he challenged the three institutions indispensable to Americans: The first is religion. It is the source of the other two – democracy and international good faith. From this we can conclude, on the one hand, that legislation for neutrality could be harmful, and on the other hand, that the strength of the nation and that of the democracies must be increased. [55] In effect Roosevelt had thrown down his glove for internationalism and was attempting to educate the public and Congress towards their cooperation.

The scene for Hitler’s next war of nerves was the Polish Corridor and the free city of Dorzig. On 1 September, 1939, using the pretext that the Versailles Treaty had unjustly carried out valuable German territory in order to create a free international city, Hitler massed troops at the Polish border and attacked. Grantees by British Prime Minister Chamberlain and French President Edward Deldier of Poland’s borders precipitated those powers to declare a state of war on the Reich. [56] That dramatic event served to drive a wedge in the American public opinion.

While public opinion remained isolationist in character it also demonstrated a desire to assist Great Britain and France. In early September 1939, an opinion poll revealed that 44 percent of Americans would be willing to send arms to Europe if England and France were in danger. [57] President Roosevelt while conscious of England and France’s predicament was nevertheless obliged to evoke the neutrality act, closing American arsenals to the belligerent. A mid-September communication from Ambassador Joseph P.

Kennedy in London advised of Chamberlain’s belief that the inability to gain access to American munitions would be sheer disaster for England and France,[58] set FDR into searching for a way to manipulate the legislation. Roosevelt designed his plan carefully as he had to allay isolationist fears at the same time open up the American arsenals. The plan, which was proposed by Senator Pittman on October 2, 1939, was attacked by Borah, Johnson, Nye and Lafollette. Charging that European nations were guilty of power politics and did not deserve to be aided. 59] The new law abolished the arms embargo on arms and munitions and put them on a Cash and Carry basis. In a clever attempt to assuage the isolationists FDR revoked the existing law which allowed merchantmen with non-military cargoes to enter belligerent waters. The plan received heated criticism and was subject to a lengthy debate. Emotions ran high, to the point of irrational arguments. For example, Senator Charles Lindenbergh became so enraged at the Cash and Carry prospect that he proposed: “the seizure of French and British holdings in the Americas as payment of their war debts in the First World War. [60] The passage of the administrative measure on 3 November 1939 was another hesitant step towards growing internationalism. Revisionist historians have denounced FDR’s actions in the Neutrality debate of 1939 as scandalous. Revisionist Charles A. Beard emphasizes FDRs guilt at suggesting the arms embargo would strengthen neutrality. [61]Beard also insists that FDR was not sincere that the United States would stay out of the war. [62] Revisionist Charles C. Tonsill furthers FDR’s alleged interventionist tendencies by suggesting that FDR’s selection of Republicans Henry L.

Stimson as Secretary of War and Frank Knox as Secretary of the Navy into his Cabinet as evidence of FDR’s belligerent tendencies. Tonsill called Stimson: “a notorious warhawk” and stated “It is apparent that after June 1940 the Administration embarked upon a phoney bipartisan policy ;that pointed directly to American intervention in the European conflict. “[63] The fall of France in June 1940 had a profound effect on American foreign policy. Firstly, it served to galvanize to the American people how close the war was coming to them. 64] Secondly, it unleashed the debate of whether to establish diplomatic relations with the ‘new’ french Vichy government, which occupied the part of France Hitler had chosen not to occupy. [65] The Roosevelt Administration, after acrimonious debate, decided to establish relations with the Vichy regime. FDR reasoned that ti would provide them with a view of Hitler’s flank and a possibility to minimize Nazi influence, prevent Vichy from declaring war on Britain, and prevent remaining French Naval assets from passing to Hitler. [66]

Thirdly, the fall of France gave rise to influential pressure groups. The Committee to defend America by Aided the Allies was founded in May 1940 and headed by William Allen White, a Republican newspaper editor from Kansas. Their mandate was to prevent American direct intervention by strengthening the allies. According to historian Ronald J. Caridi, White’s committee was in part responsible for the 2 August 1940 Selective Service Bill and the 18 billion dollar appropriation for military preparedness. [67] These actions made it clear that FDR believed that war was likely in the next year.

Opposition to White’s group was headed by the American First Committee. Representing the mood of isolationism their goal was to keep the peace – more important than the defence of democracy in Europe. [68] This group found the support of isolationist senators Clark, Nye, Wheeler and Lafollette and proved to be troublesome to Roosevelt’s attempts to bring the country around to internationalism. Roosevelt’s attention was temporarily directed inwards after his decision to run for an unprecedented third term in office in the November 1940 election.

Pitted against the relatively unknown Republican Candidate Wendell Wilkie of Indiana, FDR successfully defended his office with 55 percent of the popular vote. [69] Fortified by electoral success FDR attempted to formalize his commitment to England. British Ambassador Lord Lothian and Under Secretary of the British Treasury made a passionate plea about their dwindling coffers as a result of the Cash and Carry legislation whilst on a visit to the United States shortly after the election. [70] When Congress convened in the first week of January 1941, unveiled his revolutionary lend-lose concept.

The bill would enable the President to lend or loose arm or support to any country whose defence was vital to the United States. [71] Not only was this bill perceived to be another step closer to intervention, it would resolve the long standing conflict between the executive and Congress. It would also render war debts obsolete and remove Britain’s Cash and Carry problem. [72] Non-interventionists rallied to their cause. Testifying voraciously before a Senate committee members remarked: “The lend-loose program is a New Deal Triple A Foreign Policy; it will plow under every fourth American oy” and “lending war equipment is a good deal like lending chewing gum. You don’t want it back”[73] and “a device to give the president the power to engage in undeclared wars throughout the world. “[74] FDR defended his policy, claiming that Britain’s survival was vital to the defence of America and denied that lend-lease would push the United States toward war. [75] The ensuing debate, while sharp, became perfunctory after Wendal Willike, leader of the Republican Party, endorsed the bill to thereby make it a bi-partisan proposal.

On 11 March, 1941, the President signed the lend-lease bill and within a month Congress appropriated 7 billion dollars for aid to Britain and its allies. [76] This act accented isolationist fears that the United States was on a crash course with European entanglements. Churchill, having secured a financial lifeline, next hoped to induce the United States into a state of belligerency. [77] However, throughout 1941 Roosevelt refused to go beyond the policy of all aid short of war. His actions were calculated and removed from one crisis to another, careful not to go beyond what he thought Congress and the American public would accept. 78] His meeting with Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland to devise an Atlantic Charter and his skilful use of the USS Grier incident and German torpedoing of the USS Reuben James reflect his policy of gradual interventionism. Revisionist writers such as Charles C. Tonsill saw Roosevelt in quite a different light. Tonsill bewlieved that Roosevelt by 1940-41 was on a course to take the United States to war with Germany in order to save Britain and Russia. He points to the destroyer deal and lend-lease as part of a scheme to provoke Hitler.

Hitler’s refusal to budge from his ‘one enemy at a time’ strategy promoted FDR to look to the Far East as a way into the ‘back door’ of the war. [79] In the revisionist view[80], the economic boycott of Japan and Washington officials’ refusal to meet with the Japanese prime minister provide evidence to support their conspiracy theory. [81]Revisionists claim that FDR exposed Pearl Harbour in order to provide a sneak attack and thus draw the United States into the war. Secretary Stimson’s remark at a White House meeting in November 1941 only served to support their contentions.

Referring to the problem of Japanese-American relations Stimson questioned: “how we should manoeuvre them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot. “[82] According to such writers as Herbert Feis, William L. Longer and S. Everett Gleason, the conspiracy idea has no foundation. These ‘court historians’ as revisionist contemptuously refer to them, claim that: “each of America’s diplomatic moves in the Pacific in 1940-41 was consistent with Roosevelt’s administrations estimate of rational interest and requirements of international morality. “[83]

The foreign policies forwarded by FDR during his three terms in office have created considerable debate. Isolationists claim FDR led the country to war by adopting an international posture in foreign policy. Revisionists vow that FDR deepened the nation and led America into the war by the ‘back door’. Was FDR an opportunist who assumed an ideological halo? or was he a realist who adapted himself to changing situations? [84] On the afternoon of Thursday, 12 April 1941, during a sitting for a portrait, FDR suddenly lost consciousness. He died several hours later without ever regaining consciousness. 85] With his death he took with him the answers which could have settled the controversy arising from the maritime diplomacy. Roosevelt was unable to see the victory which his leadership had helped to create but his wartime diplomacy ensured the allied victory on – 1945. BIBLIOGRAPHY Brandon, Donald. American Foreign Policy. New York:L Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966 Caridi, Ronald J. 20th Century American Foreign Policy. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. , 1974. Carroll, John M. and George C. Herring, eds. Modern American Diplomacy. Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc. , 1984. Challenger, Richard D.

From Isolation to Containment, 1921 – 1952. Edinburgh: R & R Clark, Ltd. , 1970. DeConde, Alexander. Isolation and Security. North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1951. Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste. From Wilson to Roosevelt. trans Nancy Lyman Roelker, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. Guinsburg, Thomas N. The Pursuit of Isolationism in the United States Senate from Versailles to Pearl Harbour. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. , 1982. Rieselbach, Leroy N. The Roots of Isolationism. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. , 1966. Roosevelt’s Foreign Policy, 1933-1941.

New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc. , 1942. Simpson, Michael. Franklin D. Roosevelt. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Inc. , 1989. Schulzinger, Robert D. American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. Wiltz, John E. From Isolation to War, 1931 – 1941. Illinois: AHM Publishing Corporation, 1968. Divine, Robert A. The Reluctant Belligerent. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. , 1965. Cole, Wayne S. ‘Senator Key Pittman and American Neutrality Politics, 1933 – 1940′ in The Mississippi Valley Historical Review. XLVI, June 1959 to March 1960. Stone, Ralph A. The Illinois Senators Among the Irrenconcilables’ in The Mississippi Valley Historical Society. L. February 1963 to March 1964. ———————– [1] . Roosevelt’s Foreign Policy: 1933-1941. (New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc. , 1942), p. 552. [2]Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, From Wilson to Roosevelt Foreign Policy of the United States. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 219. [3]Ibid, p. 220. [4]Ibid, p. 220. [5]Jane Kardine Vieth, ‘The Diplomacy of the Depression’, in Modern American Diplomacy. John M. Carroll and George C. Herring, eds. (Delaware: Scholarly Resources Ltd. , 1986), p. 1. [6]Ibid, p. 72. [7]Duroselle, p. 227. and Robert D. Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 151. [8]Ibid, p. 72. [9]Ibid, p. 74. [10]Ibid, p. 74. [11]Michael Simpson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. , 1989), p. 22. [12]Looking for new perspectives on the depression, FDR turned to University Campuses. Members included Raymond Moley, Doc O’Connor, FDR’s law partner, Rosenman and two of Moley’s Columbian colleagues, Rex Fuguell, an agricultural economist, and Adolf Berle, an expert on credit and corporations.

For more information see Simpson, p. 19-20. [13]Ibid, p. 19. [14]Vieth, p. 75. [15]Schulzinger, p. 153 and Richard D. Challenger, From Isolation to Containment, (London: Edward Arnold Publishers, Ltd. , 1970), p. 65. [16]Duroselle, p. l 230. [17]Schulzinger, p. 151. [18]Ibid, p. 153. [19]John E. Wiltz, From Isolationism to War, 1931 – 1941, (Illinois: AHM Publishing Corporation, 1968), p. 4. [20]Ibid, p. 5. [21]Ibid, p. 5. [22]Ibid, p. 5. [23]Leroy N. Rieselbach, The Roots of Isolationism, (Indianapolis: The Babbs-Merril Company, Inc. , 1966), p. 9. [24]Ibid, p. 10. [25]Ibid, p. 10. [26]Wiltz, p. . [27]Rieselbach, p. 11. [28]Schulzinger, p. 158. [29]Ibid, p. 158. [30]Thomas N. Guinsburg, The Pursuit of Isolationism in the United States Senate from Versailles to Pearl Harbour, (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. , 1982), p. 1. [31]Weinberg defines non-entanglement to be: the absence of voluntarily incurred relationships, formal or informal, which remove the substantial control of the nation’s action from its own choice, by placing it in the will, influence, or career of other nations. See Guinsberg op cit. p. 4 for more information. [32]Ibid, p. 8. [33]Ibid, p. 8. [34]Ibid, p. 8. 35]Ibid, p. 647. Hull’s views on foreign policy were internationalist while Pittman adopted a more insular non-interventionist posture. [36]Ralph A. Stone, “Two Illinois Senators among the Incorrigible”, in The mississippi Volley Historical Association, L, February 1963, to March 1964, p. 1 note 1. [37]Cole, p. 648. [38]Richard D. Challenger, From Isolationism to Containment, 1921 – 1952, (London: Edward Arnold Publishing, 1970), p. 66. [39]On May 7, 1915, the Oceanliner Luisitania, on which carried American passengers, was mistakenly torpedoed by a German U-20 submarine off the coast of Ireland.

Of the 1959 passengers, 1198 were lost including 128 American citizens. See Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, op cit, p. 46. [40]Ibid, p. 240. [41]Ibid, p. 240. [42]Ibid, p. 78. [43]Vieth, p. 88. [44]Challenger, p. 66. [45]Ibid, p. 78. [46]Carroll, p. 79. [47]Donald Brandon, American Foreign Policy, new York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966, p. 61. [48]In 1935, Louis Ludlow, an Indiana Democrat, introduced a constitutional amendment to require a referendum before Congress could declare war. Which was successfully blocked by FDR at that time. 49]Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. , 1965), p. 49. [50]Ibid, p. 49. [51]Ronald J. Caridi, 20th Century American Foreign Policy, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. , 1974), p. 166. [52]Brandon, p. 66. [53]Caridi, p. 166. [54]Ibid, p. 166. [55]Duroselle, p. 256. [56]Caridi, p. ; 173. [57]Duroselle, p. 260. [58]Wiltz, p. 75. [59]Duroselle, p. 260. [60]Ibid, p. 261. [61]Wiltz, p. 78. [62]Ibid, p. 78. [63]Ibid, p. 78. [64]Duroselle, p. 270. [65]Wiltz, p. 79. [66]Ibid, p. 79. 67]Caridi, p. 177. [68]Duroselle, p. 277. [69]Schulzinger, p. 174. [70]Caridi, p. 179. [71]Schulzinger, p. 173. [72]Duroselle, p. 286. [73]Schulzinger, p. 176. [74]Caridi, p. 180. [75]Wiltz, p. 85. [76]Schulzinger, p. 173. [77]Simpson, p. 59. [78]Challenger, p. 67. [79]Wiltz, p. 99. [80]Other revisionists include Charles A. Beard, Harry Elmer Barnes, Georges Morgenstern, and Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald. [81]Wiltz, p. 900. [82]Ibid, p. 100. [83]Ibid, p. 101. [84]Duroselle, p. 217. [85]Ibid, p. 422. ———————– 20