Parallel stage of development, and wanted to
Parallel between Config and Sony: Another case example described in the chapter is with the Sony Case (page 49). This case described the behavior framework of how Managers are more reluctant to terminate losing projects, once a project has been adopted.
Most importantly management is averse to a sure loss. In both case examples, management was reluctant to end the project once it has been adopted, since terminating it would mean management would have to accept a sure loss. Thus in both cases, the management decided to hold on to the project and choose the risky alternative.For Config, early development during 1981 and 1982 shows that Config would not properly integrated with the system, and that the usages was extremely slow and not create much value to the sales team. Dispute such complaint management did not discontinue the project during the early stage of development, and wanted to have system be operational by 1983.
By 1983, the system was still not operational. Again, sales representative involved in the project continue to complain vigorously, but management agreed to continue on with the project.Similar to the case of Sony, during the early project planning phase, Ibuka’s team succeeded in developing a prototype.
However, the team did not develop a viable manufacturing process. Despite the early warning sign for both project, management was confident and optimistic to make the project work rather than terminate, thus they continue to fund the project and took on the risky alternative. In 1985, the Config project was finally operation. However representative that used the system did not find the value of it and found it to be more time consuming.
By 1990, Config had yet to catch on with the sales force and did not find the value of the system. Despite these complaints management was reluctant to give it up because they would throw out 10 years of work. As with Sony, once they started production, they realize that the production process was not able to produce a profit, yet knowing this, Sony and Ibuka refuse to terminate the project and continue to produce and sell each unit for a loss. In both cases, management was reluctant to terminate the project and continue to fund the project, even knowing that the project was in operations for a loss or did not create any value.