More Stroud states that his propose is

More Stroud states that his propose is

More on the problem of the external world In his paper about the problem of the external world Stroud’s conclusion is that we can’t prove we are not dreaming.

He takes as he calls it, a ‘sceptical’ standpoint by saying that there is not solution to the problem of the external world. There are two main objections to Stroud’s position towards the skeptics like Descartes. First, saying there is not solution to the problem of the external world is just as skeptic and it does not take us anywhere.

Second, being skeptical about the world around us is irrelevant for knowledge.It is understood that from the beginning of his paper Stroud states that his propose is not to solve the problem of the external world, but to understand it since for him there is not solution to such a dilemma. On the other hand, by accepting his so called ‘Scepticism about the external world’ is a skeptical position that takes us nowhere because believing that we cannot know anything about the world around us implies that we already know something, namely that if we don’t know then we know that we don’t know. In Hank Hanegraaff’s words, “Even those who deny reality look both ways before they cross the street. <http://www. oppapers.

com/essays/Arguments-Against-Skepticism/108446>. There is a lot yet to be known but we already know that, and all we knew before knowing something we did not. Maybe there is not a problem of the external world in the first place, and considering that we don’t know about it as a possibility makes no sense. If we knew we are a brain in a vat but we couldn’t prove it then it wouldn’t matter with respect to what we consider knowledge because proving we are brains in a vat would be impossible since we would fall in an infinite regress.Therefore from my must humble point of view the reason why there is not solution to the problem of the external world if taken from Stroud’s perspective is because there is not a problem in the first place. As Moore places it, it is just a matter of common sense to determine what the external world is.

“Here is one hand and here is another. ” Moore G. Proof of an external world (1935). With that argument Moore showed there could be at least two objects that were external and that he could prove.Since for Kant ‘external’ was an “ambiguous” term, external could be relative to the person or object’s perspective, more simply put everything is external to everything, and based on Moore’s argument if we can know that, then that’s a prove for the external world. The second objection to Stroud’s conclusion on the external world is that scepticism is irrelevant to knowledge.

The fact that we can doubt that the floor where we are standing is solid won’t change the fact that we are standing on it and that it feels to be solid and that we are not sinking.The biggest problem with accepting the idea that we can’t prove we are not dreaming and therefore we cannot know anything is that it is a very impractical way of thinking even from a realistic point of view. For instance I could quote “Even if we accept that skepticism cannot be dismissed outright, is it not a highly inconvenient – if not downright impractical – position to hold? Suppose we have to make our way to the top floor of a building and are thoroughgoing skeptics. We could take the lift, but how do we know it will work? Shouldn’t we climb up instead?Then again, how do we know climbing will work, or even that the building is there at all? What about when we want to get down again? Isn’t jumping just as sensible an option as taking the lift or stairs, given that we don’t really know anything? ” Newall P. (2005) Epistemology 2 <http://www. galilean-library.

org/site/index. php/page/index. html/_/essays/introducingphilosophy/20-epistemology-2-r37>.

This quote is a reference to show how impractical and unnecessary skepticism is for knowledge and that should be considered before accepting a conclusion of not knowing anything as skeptics do.Moore argues that “to prove something is not required for knowledge” Moore G. Proof of an external world (1935), because as I stated in the last paragraph trying to do so will make us fall in an infinite regress by trying to prove that we know that we know… Moore also explains that to prove something “the premises must be different form the conclusion” and that should be enough to accept as knowledge the constant feedback there is between us and the world around us including ourselves as external objects to each other. Hank Hanegraaff’s words, “Even those who deny reality look both ways before they cross the street.

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